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COMMENTS
THE HYDE AMENDMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF
ITS STATE PROGENY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional right to privacy included a woman's decision on
whether to terminate her pregnancy.' The right to terminate the
pregnancy, however, was not absolute, and had to be weighed, at
various stages of the pregnancy, against the state's "important and
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman .... [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life." 3
Justice Blackmun, at the outset of his majority opinion, acknowledged
the Court's "awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy, and of the vigorous opposing views, ... and of
the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject
inspires."" In view of this aura of emotionalism that surrounds the
topic of abortion, it is not surprising that Roe has born the progeny it
has in the six years since the case was decided.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 162. In determining that a Texas abortion statute, which failed to
distinguish between abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy and abortions occurring later in the pregnancy, was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court set forth a tripartite standard to which a state abortion statute
must comply to withstand constitutional attack:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably
related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 114. For in-depth discussion of Roe v. Wade, see Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, Foreward:Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116 (1973).
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A rather predictable problem, once the Court has declared that a
woman has a right to choose to undergo an abortion, is the source of
the funds that will enable indigent women to exercise their right. The
first attack on this issue, in Beal v. Doe,' focused on whether states
participating in the Medicaid program should be required to provide
indigent women with funds for abortions which were nontherapeutic.'
The Beal Court held that the states were not so required.
Congress' enactment of the Hyde Amendment,' a rider to the 1977
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Appropriation Act, precluded
states in the Medicaid program from receiving federal funding for
abortions except where the abortion was necessary to save the life of
the mother. This limitation on funding goes beyond the holding of
Beal in that Beal merely allowed states to withhold funds for purely
elective abortions. Under the Hyde Amendment, women seeking abortions which would be considered medically necessary, that is, necessary
for the mental or physical well-being of the mother, could not receive
money through state Medicaid programs unless the state was willing to
absorb the cost.
Several states have not been willing to absorb the costs of those
abortions made ineligible for federal funding by the Hyde Amendment, and herein lies a new, vital area of litigation. In reaction to the
federal Hyde Amendment, states have begun to enact their own
"Hyde-type" amendments. These state statutes, insofar as they
deprive Medicaid recipients of the ability to obtain "necessary"
therapeutic abortions, are currently being attacked. 8 These attacks, the
most recent progeny of the abortion issue, will serve as the focus of
this comment.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ABORTION FUNDING ISSUE

One vital issue which has been raised as a result of the Roe decision
5. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
6. Id. at 440. Nontherapeutic abortions are abortions which are purely elective. A
qualified physician would determine them not to be medically necessary.
7. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434.
8. See Hodgson v. Board of County Commissioners, 48 U.S.L.W. 2476 (8th Cir.
Jan. 9, 1980); Reproductive Health Services v. Freeman, 48 U.S.L.W. 2475 (8th Cir.
Jan. 9, 1980); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 463 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd, 591

F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2181, 2182 (1979); Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d
1362 (4th Cir. 1978); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp.
529 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Zbaraz v.
Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), on remand, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
juris postponed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5); Roe v. Casey,
464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978); D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978);
Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Sulp. 1048 (E.D. La. 1977); Right to Choose v. Byrne,
169 N.J. Super. 543 (1979).
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is whether states could be compelled to provide aid to indigent women
who wish to exercise their right to terminate their pregnancy. Title XIX
of the Social Security Act 9 and the states' obligations thereunder has
been the prime source of litigation with respect to this issue.
In Beal v. Doe,'I the Court held that Title XIX did not require the
'
states to fund nontherapeutic abortions. I In Beal, the Court was construing a Pennsylvania statute which limited funding provided under
the Medicaid program only to those abortions deemed medically
necessary. ' 2 The Court said that the state statute was sufficient to comply with the primary objective of Title XIX, that being to furnish
9. Social Security Act (Medicaid Assistance Programs), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et. seq.
(1976). There is nothing specifically in the language of Title XIX which requires that
abortions be funded at all. In fact, there are no specific references made to any medical
procedures. The Court in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), dealt with this issue by
stating that the Act does not compel states to fund "every medical procedure" and the
state is given "broad discretion .

.

. to adopt standards for determining the extent of

medical assistance." Id. at 444. The standards need only be "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives" of Title XIX. Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. V
1970). The Beal Court did not specifically say abortions were includable procedures,
but the fact that it considered the issue and analyzed the state statute's reasonableness
and consistency leads to this inference. Additional support for this inference is also
derived from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 622-23
(3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit noted that upon amending the Medicaid statute in
1972 to include family planning services, Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §
299E, 86 Stat. 1462, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1970), Congress did not
specifically exclude abortion. The court said that the failure to exclude abortions indicated that Congress intended for abortions to be included as a family planning service.
10. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
11. Id. at 447.
12. It is important to note the breadth of the Pennsylvania statute that was upheld
in Beal in comparison to the restrictive funding statutes enacted by the states in
response to the Hyde Amendment. As the Beal Court noted:
An abortion is deemed medically necessary under the Pennsylvania Medicaid
program if:
"(1) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of the pregnancy
may threaten the health of the mother;
"(2) There is documented medical evidence that an infant may be born with
incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency; or
"(3) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of a pregnancy
resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest, may constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of a patient; and
"(4) Two other physicians chosen because of their recognized professional
competency have examined the patient and have concurred in writing; and
"(5) The procedure is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals."
Id. at 441 n.3.
The Pennsylvania statute allows for funding of medically necessary abortions,
whereas the state "Hyde-type" statutes currently under attack preclude funding for a
medically necessary procedure. See, e.g., note 22 infra.
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assistance to individuals who are financially unable to obtain
"necessary medical services."' 3 The Court found further support
for
its interpretation of Title XIX from the fact that at the time Title XIX
was passed in 1965, nontherapeutic abortions were illegal in most
states and it could not have been Congress' intent to require states participating in the Medicaid program to fund illegal medical
procedures."' The Court also relied on the position taken by HEW, the
agency in charge of administration of the Social Security Act. The
agency's position was that funding of nontherapeutic abortions was
allowed under the Act, but was not mandated.'"
While holding that a state was not required to fund nontherapeutic
abortions, the Beal Court said that a state may provide such funding if
it wished.1 6 Shortly after the Beal decision was announced however,
the Hyde Amendment 7 to the HEW Appropriations bill for 1976-1977
went into effect. The original version of the Hyde Amendment limited
federal funding reimbursement for abortions to states participating in
the Medicaid program to those abortions that were necessary to save
the mother's life.' 8 For fiscal years 1978 and 1979, Congress did expand the category of abortions that could be federally funded to include situations where an abortion is "necessary for victims of rape or
incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law
enforcement agency or public health service . . . or where severe and
13. 432 U.S. at 444. A similar Connecticut statute withstood an equal protection
challenge in the companion case of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Court
upheld a statute similar to the one in Beal. The equal protection challenge was based
on the fact that Connecticut funded therapeutic abortions and that this distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic abortions deprived a woman of her constitutional right to an abortion. The Maher Court began its analysis by interpreting the
nature of the right created in Roe v. Wade. The Maher Court said that rather than
granting an unrestricted constitutional right to an abortion, Roe protects a woman
"from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 473-74. The Court determined that the Connecticut
regulation did not interfere with the woman's right to choose to have an abortion,
stating that "the indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected
by the Connecticut regulation." Id. at 474. In applying the rational basis test, the
Court said the regulation rationally furthered the state's "legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth." Id. at 478, citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 444, 446 (1977).
14. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 444, 447 (1977).
15. Id. The Court noted the deference to be paid to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own statute absent indications such construction is wrong. See, e.g.,
N.Y. State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973), quoting Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
16. 432 U.S. at 447. The Court bases this election of the states on Title XIX, rather
than as a matter of the constitutional right to an abortion decision.
17. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434.
18. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/5
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long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the
pregnancy were carried to term . . .."" But the net cutback on federal
funding for abortions would 0require states to fully absorb the cost of
"non-Hyde-type" abortions," quite likely to be a burdensome task. 21
In response to the Hyde Amendment, many states have enacted similar
22
statutes which severly limit funding of abortions. These state statutes
are far more restrictive than the funding preclusions upheld in Beal,23
and in many instances are even more restrictive than the fiscal years
1978 and 1979 version of the federal Hyde Amendment.
On its face, the Hyde Amendment appears to be Congress' attempt
to codify the Beal decision in that it sets forth the categories of abortions the federal government will fund. However, whereas Beal holds
that states have no duty to fund nontherapeutic abortions, the Hyde
Amendment has exceeded the scope of Beal by effectively denying
funds for abortions that would qualify as medically necessary. 2 '
Whether such denial is constitutionally permissible is the focus of the
attacks on the state "Hyde-type" statutes. Indeed, Justice Powell, in
Beal, warned that "serious statutory questions might be presented if a
19. Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460. Act of Oct. 18,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-482, § 101, 92 Stat. 1603. It is under this enactment of the Hyde
Amendment that attacks to subsequently enacted state Hyde-type laws were brought.
For fiscal year 1980, Congress has deleted the circumstance of federal funding for
abortions necessary to preserve the mother's health. Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662.
20. "Non-Hyde-type" abortions are those abortions that are not necessary to save
the mother's life, preserve her health, or to terminate pregnancy resulting from rape or
incest.
21. An indication that such funding would be burdensome on the states comes
from the fact that states often assert their interest in allocating their limited funds as
justification for the state's "Hyde-type" statutes. See D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp.
609, 618 (D. Utah 1978).
22. The statutes seem to be of three types. See, e.g., D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp.
609 (D. Utah 1978) (the Utah statute, an example of the most restrictive type abortion
statute, precludes funding of abortions unless necessary to save the life of the mother);
Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979) (the Massachusetts statute, an
example of an intermediate type abortion statute, precludes funding of abortions
unless the abortion is necessary to save the mother's life or in cases of rape or incest if
reported within 30 days); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (the
Georgia statute, an example of the most liberal type of abortion statute, permits abortion funding in the 1978-1979 Hyde Amendment circumstances; that is, in those situations where an abortion is necessary to save the mother's life, in cases of rape or incest
if promptly reported, or where a full term pregnancy would result in severe physical
damage).
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529,
533 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Physicians may consider an abortion medically necessary to
preserve the mental, as well as the physical, health of the mother).
Published by eCommons, 1980
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state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its
coverage .... ,"5While there have been some constitutional challenges
to the Hyde Amendment itself,2" the majority of responses has been to
25. 432 U.S. at 444.
26. Woe v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1978). In Woe, the federal
district court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the original version of the
Hyde Amendment. That version allowed federal funding for abortions to states in the
Medicaid program only when the abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother.
The court saw the issue to be whether the government funding provisions under Hyde
impaired the woman's "constitutionally protected interest" in choosing abortion as an
alternative to childbirth. Id. at 235. The court concluded that the Hyde Amendment
placed "no constitutionally impermissible obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to
an abortion." Id. at 236. Applying the principles set forth in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977), see note 15 supra, the Woe court implied that although the government
could not directly interfere with a woman's choice of abortion, it could encourage "an
alternative activity (childbirth] consonant with legislative policy." 460 F. Supp. at 235.
See also Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The district court in
Zbaraz held the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See
notes 131 through 147 and accompanying text infra.
In McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y.), stay denied, 429 U.S. 935,
1085 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 916 (1977), federal district court Judge
Dooling declared the 1976 version of the Hyde Amendment, which limited abortion
funding to life endangering circumstances, unconsistitutional. The court said the effect
of the appropriations bill was to "deny [indigent pregnant women] reimbursement for
medical assistance only if they elect to exercise their constitutionally protected right to
terminate their pregnancies." 421 F. Supp. at 541-42. Judge Dooling issued an injunction against enforcing the Hyde Amendment, and said the federal government was required to fund all abortions, both therapeutic and nontherapeutic, to eligible Medicaid
recipients. This judgment was vacated, however, in light of the decision of Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), which held that the federal government was not required to
fund nontherapeutic abortions. See 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
Recently, however, Judge Dooling declared the 1978-79 version of the Hyde
Amendment unconstitutional. McRae v. HEW, 48 U.S.L.W. 2492 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1980), stay denied sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980)
(No. 79-1268), prob. juris. noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-1268). The court noted that the amendment, which denied funding for abortions except where the abortion was necessary to save a woman's life, preserve her physical
health, or in cases where the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest, violated the
fifth amendment. Circumstances may arise when an abortion may be deemed medically
necessary to preserve a woman's mental health. The exclusion of this category of
medically necessary abortions from the Hyde Amendment "is not reasonable, and it
has no support in the permissible legislative purpose" of protecting fetal life, since the
woman's interest in her own health overrides this state interest. Id. By not providing
funds for all medically necessary abortions, a woman was unduly inhibited in exercising her constitutional right to decide whether or not to choose abortion as an alternative to pregnancy, a "part of the liberty protected by the 5th Amendment." Id.
The court also noted that because "certain religious groups approve of abortion
as a matter of responsible personal decision," the Hyde Amendment may also violate
the first amendment. Id.
Judge Dooling issued an injunction against enforcing the Hyde Amendment and
ordered the federal government to begin paying for all medically necessary abortions
under the Medicaid Act. McRae v. HEW will be consolidated with the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decision of Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), juris.
postponed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5).
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the "Hyde-type" statutes of the various states." The constitutional
challenges to these amendments have been primarily based on violations of the supremacy clause, 2" and the equal protection clause29 of
the fourteenth amendment."
Emerging from these attacks is a tripartite view with respect to the
constitutionality of the "Hyde-type" state statutes. Several of the
courts have taken a liberal view of the states' obligation to fund abortions and have held that states must fund all medically necessary abortions, thereby finding the restrictive state statutes unconstitutional. 3 '
The primary basis upon which such decisions rest is violation of the
supremacy and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.3 2 At the
opposite extreme, at least one court has held that states need not fund
any abortions." The court stipulated, however, that if indeed the
states were required to fund any abortions at all, the requirement
would extend only to those abortions necessary to save the life of the
mother.3 " Supremacy and equal protection challenges were rejected
under this view. Finally, a middle ground approach contends that
states need fund only those abortions for which they are eligible to
receive federal funding under the Hyde Amendment." These decisions
rested on the ground that the state statutes were not inconsistent with
the Medicaid Act and therefore did not violate the supremacy clause.
III.

SUPREMACY CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO STATE "HYDE-TYPE"
STATUTES

Several of the decisions concerning state statutes that restrict the
funding of abortions under the Medicaid program have been decided
on statutory grounds. That is, the issue in such cases has been whether
27. See note 8 supra.

28. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See note 8 supra. The cases generally join both type challenges to the state
statutes.
31. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 48 U.S.L.W. 2475 (8th Cir. Jan. 1,
1980); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp 529 (S.D. Ohio
1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp.
487 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 169 N.J. Super. 543 (1979). Note that
Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. 11. 1979) is a variant of the liberal view in
that it bases the state's abortion funding obligation on the stage of fetal viability. See
notes 133 through 147 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 88 through 130 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
supremacy clause cases that have adopted the liberal view. For a discussion of the
equal protection cases, see notes 131 through 156 and accompanying text.
33. D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
34. Id. at 624.
35. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (lst Cir. 1979).
Published by eCommons, 1980
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the state statutes as enacted conflict with the federal Medicaid Act,
thereby violating the principle of the supremacy clause. An analysis of
the tripartite view which has emerged as a result of these challenges will
illustrate the current treatment of the abortion funding issue on the
state level.
A. D.R. v. Mitchell3 6 - An Extreme Casefor Withholding
Virtually All Funds for Abortions
A Utah statute limited state funding of abortions for Medicaid
recipients to cases where the abortions were necessary to save the life
of the mother.3 7 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
36. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978). Mitchell was a class action brought by a
19-year old pregnant woman who was a Medicaid recipient. Although she and her
physician decided that an abortion was in her best interest, she was unable to procure
one because area medical centers would not be reimbursed for performing the abortion
due to a recently enacted statute by the Utah legislature which precluded funds for
abortions unless the mother's life was endangered. Plaintiff thereafter sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal district court.
In addition to supremacy clause challenges, plaintiff alleged violations of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the federal Constitution. Plaintiff asserted
that due process was violated in that by not providing funds for abortions that were
medically necessary, the Utah statute infringed upon her exercise of a "constitutionally
protected fundamental right." 456 F. Supp. at 612. Equal protection was alleged to
have been violated because the statute discriminated between therapeutic and nontherapeutic abortions, and that by refusing to fund therapeutic abortions, the state impermissibly limited the plaintiff in exercising her constitutional right to an abortion.
Id.
The court had to determine the exact nature of the right that the plaintiff alleged
was violated. Relying on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the court determined that
the abortion "right" established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was not a fundamental one, at least "in the context of state funding of abortions." 456 F. Supp. at
613. Rather, the plaintiff only had a right to make her abortion decision free from any
undue interference by the state. The Mitchell court also found that the plaintiff was
not a member of a recognized suspect class. Therefore, a strict scrutiny standard was
not to be applied in evaluating the Utah statute; rather, the statute would only be subjected to a rational relation test. Id.
The court first rejected the plaintiff's argument because the Utah statute did not
per se prohibit abortions, but rather, only prohibited the funding of abortions. Relying
on Maher, the Mitchell court said that the Utah statute did not unduly interfere with a
woman's right to have an abortion merely because it withheld funding for certain of
the procedures. Id. at 614.
Second, the Mitchell court determined that Utah had legitimate interests in "protecting the potential life of the fetus, encouraging normal childbirth and appropriately
using state funds." Id. at 615. If indeed there was any discrimination, it was justified
by these valid interests which were "furthered by and are rationally and reasonably
related to" to the Utah statute. Id.
Other courts that have considered equal protection challenges to state statutes
limiting abortion funding have held that the statutes violated equal protection standards. See notes 133 through 156 and accompanying text infra.
37. D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
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statute, arguing that it was inconsistent with Title XIX of the Social
Security Act3" and was therefore violative of supremacy clause principles. In D.R. v. Mitchell, the court rejected the challenge to the
statute's constitutionality and held that a state could limit funding of
abortions to those which endangered the life of the mother.
In reaching its conclusion, the Mitchell court engaged in an
analysis of Title XIX and the requirements it places upon the states.
The court noted that nowhere in the Medicaid Act is a state required
per se to fund abortions. Rather, the Act sets out five categories of
medical treatment for which a state must provide aid to the
"categorically" and medically needy.3 9 The court said that a state is
not required to fund every medical procedure that may fall within
these five categories of treatment. They also noted that the states are
given great discretion in deciding which procedures to fund and the extent of the funding that they will provide. ° In so determining, the state
must use reasonable standards and these standards must be consistent
with the objectives of the Medicaid Act." The only other restriction
put on the state by the Act was that the "funds must be distributed
equally and equitably among Medicaid recipients.""' If a state complied with these requirements, it could choose the type and extent of
medical procedures it wanted to fund.
To determine whether the Utah statute met these requirements, the
Mitchell court relied primarily on the Beal case. 3 In upholding the
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
39. 456 F. Supp. at 617. The five categories are outlined in 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(B) and 1396d(a)(l)-(5) (1976):
1. Inpatient hospital services.
2. Outpatient hospital services.
3. Laboratory and X-ray services.
4. (a) Skilled nursing facility services for individuals 21 years and older.
(b) Early and periodic screening and diagnosis for persons under 21 years
of age.
(c) Family planning services and supplies.
5. Physicians services (whether furnished in the office, patient's home, a
hospital, skilled nursing facility or elsewhere).
40. 456 F. Supp. at 617-18.
41. Id. at 617, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. V 1970).
42. 456 F. Supp. at 618, citing 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)(i) (1976) (now at 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.230 (1978)).
43. 456 F. Supp. at 618. Recall that the Beal case dealt only with the constitutionality
of a statute that denied funding for nontherapeutic, and hence not medically
necessary, abortions. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra. The challenged
statute here, however, concerns a denial of funds for abortions that may be medically
necessary. Recall Justice Powell's statement in Beal that such an issue may well raise a
constitutional question. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. In Mitchell, Chief
Judge Anderson referred to Powell's statement as mere dicta and said that the issue of
the constitutionality of a denial of funding for medically necessary abortions had not
been decided by the Supreme Court in Beal. 456 F. Supp. at 619-20.
Published by eCommons, 1980
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statute under the reasonableness standard, the Mitchell court recognized
two valid state interests. First, Utah had a legitimate interest in applying the limited available state and federal funds to the most appropriate use." Secondly, as the Beal Court recognized, the "state has
a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth."' 5
The court summarily dismissed any challenge under the equal
disbursement requirement."6 The Mitchell court saw no difference between the "alleged disparate treatment in the disbursement of funds"
which the Beal Court had upheld and the alleged inequality in the present case.' 7 Even if the disbursements in the present case were unequal,
the Mitchell court noted an exception to the requirement made in
Maher v. Roe " which said that "disparate treatment in pregnancy
related procedures may presumptively be more justified than such
treatment in other medical procedures."' The reason given for the exception to the requirement of equitable distribution of funds for
pregnancy-related procedures is because the "termination of a potential human life'"" is involved.
The Mitchell court had the most difficulty with trying to construe
the Utah statute as consistent with the primary objective of Title XIX.
The Beal Court had identified the purpose of the Medicaid Act to be
the enabling of "each State, as far as practicable under the conditions
in such state, to furnish ... medical assistance on behalf of [properly
qualified recipients] whose income and resources are insufficient to
44. Id. at 618. It is interesting to note the Mitchell court's response to the often
unpersuasive "fiscal frugality" argument. States may assert that they have a legitimate
interest in appropriating limited funds in the most efficient manner. The rebuttal by
those favoring abortions is that it is less expensive to provide funding for abortions
than to fund the more costly childbirth procedures. It can be argued, as it was in Mitchell, however, that if abortions are so easily obtained as a result of being funded by
Medicaid programs, persons eligible for such funds may be encouraged to rely on
abortion as a contraceptive. Additionally, abortions may lead to "long term complication on future deliveries," thereby creating further expenses. Hardy, Privacy and
Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v.
Williams, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 927 (1976). As additional support for accepting the
"fiscal frugality" argument as a valid state interest, the Mitchell court noted that the
Beal Court did not directly respond to the "fiscal frugality" argument, since Beal
found valid state interests in other areas.
45. 456 F. Supp. at 619, citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977). The court
recognized two aspects of this interest; the state has both an interest in protecting fetal
life and in the "rate of population growth." 456 F. Supp. at 619.
46. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
47. 456 F. Supp. at 619. The Mitchell court doubted the seriousness of the equal
disbursement requirement because, as it noted, the Supreme Court in Beal did not even
discuss it.
48. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
49. 456 F. Supp. at 619, citing 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
50. Id., citing 432 U.S. at 480.
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meet the costs of necessary medical services.""1 The key phrase which
the Mitchell court had to construe was "necessary medical services." 5
It distinguished Doe v. Bolton," thereby declining to accept Bolton's
standard test for medical necessity. Bolton said that a determination
that an abortion is necessary is for a doctor to decide in light of all
relevant factors, including "physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age."5 " The Mitchell court refused to apply
the Bolton standard since Bolton dealt with an interference with a
woman's right to have an abortion. Funding of abortions, the court
said, was quite another matter and the same test does not apply."
Unable to come up with a proper definition from other sources, the
Mitchell court was compelled to develop a definition of "medically
necessary" within the meaning of Title XIX. The court, again relying
on a determination by the Beal court, defined therapeutic abortions as
those which were legal at the time Title XIX was enacted.5 6 The court
reasoned that if Title XIX required a state to fund any abortions at all
in order to participate in the federal Medicaid program, the requirement would be only for those abortions which were legal at the time
Title XIX was enacted in 1965."' At that time, the only abortions
which were legal were those required to save the life of the mother. 8
Since Congress could not have intended the Medicaid program to
cover illegal abortions, the court concluded that the Medicaid Act, to
the extent that it placed any funding obligations on the states at all,
only required the states to fund those abortions necessary to preserve
the mother's life.
The court also placed weight on the Hyde Amendment in determining the categories of abortion that states are required to fund pursuant
to the Medicaid Act. In its original version, the amendment restricted
51. Id. at 620, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
52. 456 F. Supp. at 620. The court determined that the statute itself provided no
answer. It also rejected the notion that the proper meaning of medical necessity was
that given by the medical community-"[that care] which is responsive to the problem
for which it is offered." Id., citing Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 955 (1977). Such a definition would likely require funding
of even elective abortions, and according to Beal, a state need not fund those type
abortions.
53. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
54. Id. at 192.
55. 456 F. Supp. at 621. The court supported its statement by pointing out the
Supreme Court in both Maher and Beal said "that the right to an abortion acquires an
entirely different hue and brings into play a wholly different set of factors in the funding context." Id.
56. 456 F. Supp. at 623.
57. Id. at 624.
58. Id. at 623.
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funding to life-saving abortions. The court felt that the original version
was a clear indication of the intended scope of abortion funding under
Title XIX. 9
In comparison with other cases, the Mitchell decision represents
one end of the tripartite view. The Mitchell court doubts that states are
required to fund any abortions at all. Even in its broadest sense, Mitchell stands for the proposition that, in order to comply with constitutional mandates, states need only fund those abortions necessary to
save the mother's life. Thus, under Mitchell, even the most restrictive
state statutes that limit the funding of abortions would be upheld.6 0
B. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis"' - A Middle Ground Approach to State
Funding of Abortions
Taking a middle-ground approach to the issue of state funding of
medically necessary abortions, the United States First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that although the states were free to fund whatever abortions they so chose, they were only required to fund those abortions
which were included under the 1978-1979 version of the Hyde Amendment."2 Thus, the court enjoined enforcement of a Massachusetts
statute only insofar as it denied funds for abortions that were otherwise eligible for federal reimbursement. 3 The Massachusetts statute
provided aid to Medicaid recipients for abortions only when the
pregnancy resulted from promptly reported instances of rape or incest,
or when an abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother." ' The
court ordered the legislature to modify the Statute so as to also require
funding for abortions in those instances where a full-term pregnancy
would result in serious and long lasting physical injury to the mother.6 5
Such addition would make the statute comport with the 1978-1979 version of the Hyde Amendment. Before reaching its conclusion,
however, it was necessary for the Preterm court to decide on three
issues.
First, the court determined that the Massachusetts statute, as it
59. Id. at 624. The Mitchell court's reliance on the Hyde Amendment to support
its decision was strengthened by the fact that the Beat Court, in holding that a refusal
to fund nontherapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX, made specific
reference to the then newly enacted amendment which precluded funding unless the
mother's life was endangered. The Beal Court did not mention anything to the effect
that the amendment may be unconstitutional. See 432 U.S. 438 n. 14 (1977).
60. See note 23 supra.
61. 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979).
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 122-23.
65. Id. at 134.
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stood, was inconsistent with the requirements of the Medicaid Act. 6 6
Initially, the Preterm court's analysis of the Medicaid Act was similar
to the Mitchell court's analysis. The Pretermcourt, in accord with Mitchell, noted that the purpose of the Medicaid Act, as set out in the appropriations section of the statute, 6 did not require states to fund all
medically necessary procedures. The court also relied, albeit to a more
limited degree than did Mitchell, on the Beal decision. In accordance
with Beal, the Preterm court held that when adopting a statute restricting the funding of certain abortions, the state legislature must do so in
a reasonable fashion, not inconsistent with the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. 68 To determine whether the Massachusetts statute was
reasonable and consistent with the federal funding program, the
Preterm court relied on the regulation promulgated by HEW that set
forth the means by which states could permissibly limit funding of
medical services. 69 Mitchell had not relied on this regulation, but
rather, decided the issue of consistency on an interpretation of
"necessary medical services" as stated in a section defining the
Medicaid Act's purpose. It is at this point, therefore, that the Mitchell
and Preterm analyses diverge. The Preterm court held that the
discrimination made by the Massachusetts legislature between abortions which were necessary to save a mother's life and those which
would be necessary to preserve her health was not a permissible
discrimination under the HEW regulation."' The regulation provides
that funds cannot be denied "to an otherwise eligible recipient solely
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." 7 ' Applying this
regulation to the present situation, the Preterm court said the state had
singled out a particular medical condition, a complicated pregnancy,
and restricted the funding of such condition to instances of life and
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 126.
See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
591 F.2d 121, 125, citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977).
42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1979). This section provides:

(a)

The plan must specify the amount and duration of each service that it
provides.

(b)

Each service must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to
reasonably achieve its purpose.

(c)(1)

The medicaid agency may not aribtrarily deny or reduce the amount,

duration, or scope of a required service under §§ 440.210 and 440.220 to
(2)

an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of
illness, or condition.
The agency may place appropriate limits on a service based on such

criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures.
70. 591 F.2d at 126.
71. See note 69 supra.
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death circumstances only." Thus, by this impermissible discrimina-

tion, the statute was unreasonable and inconsistent with the objectives
of Title XIX.
The court did not, however, end its analysis here. 3 Instead the
court thought it necessary to consider a second issue, that of the impact of the Hyde Amendment on state laws that deal with abortion
funding under the Medicaid Act. The plaintiffs in Preterm argued that

the federal amendment had the effect of shifting the burden to the

states to provide funding for all abortions not covered under Hyde.""
The state, however, argued, and eventually the court held, that Hyde
was a "policy decision" on abortion funding, requiring the state to
fund only those abortions federally reimbursed under the Hyde
Amendment."
Although conceding that the plain meaning of the language of the
Hyde Amendment supported the plaintiff's position, 6 the court said
that such a construction of the Hyde Amendment would produce a
result at variance with the "basic policy" of the Medicaid system,
under which there is mutual participation by the federal and state
governments in funding medical services." Where such a variant result
arises from a plain meaning reading of the statute, the court said it
may resort to outside aids to help determine the true meaning of the
statute." Therefore, the Preterm court analyzed the legislative history
of the Hyde Amendment.' As a result of its analysis of the legislative
72. 591 F.2d at 126. The court rejected the contention that such restriction was rationally related to a state's objective of saving money. The court cited Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977) for the proposition that it is considerably more expensive
to fund a pregnancy to full term than to provide funds for either therapeic or elective
abortions. But see note 44 supra.
The court also based its finding of the statute's inconsistency on the fact that a life
and death requirement substantially infringed on a physician's judgment as to medical
necessity, as medical practice does not require necessity to be based upon life or death.
591 F.2d at 127.
73. Indeed, if the court had ended its analysis here, the Massachusetts statute
would have been deemed unconstitutional in violation of the supremacy clause since,
by its impermissible discrimination based upon medical condition, it would have contravened a federal statute, Title XIX.
74. 591 F.2d at 127. Plaintiff's argument was that the Hyde Amendment did not
affect the state's obligation to fund procedures in accordance with the Medicaid Act.
75. Id. at 128.
76. "The Amendment states that 'none of the funds provided for in this paragraph
shall be used' to perform abortions, unless they fall within specified categories, and
thus reads as a mere withdrawal of federal funds for certain purposes. No mention is
made in the provision of any impact on the state's obligations." Id.
77. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
78. 591 F.2d at 128, citing U.S. v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1939).
79. In discussing the content of the debates relied upon, the Preterm court first
noted that neither conference nor committee reports were available and all that could
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be relied upon were the "debates and insertions in the Congressional Record." 591
F.2d at 128. It concluded, however, that what could be gleaned from these sources was
sufficient to indicate Congress's intent in passing the Hyde Amendment.
The court began by noting that there were few comments which indicated that the
Amendment was merely "concerned with... the expenditure of federal dollars." See,
e.g., 591 F.2d at 129. The court further believed that even these statements were "consistent with the conclusion that Congress utilized the [Hyde Amendment] as the means
of making a substantive change in the law." Id.
The Preterm court also relied on a statement made by Congressman Hyde to the
effect that an appropriations bill is the only way to reach "complex issues" such as
abortion and the prohibiting thereof. Id., citing 123 CONG. REC. H. 6,083 (June 17,
1977). In a statement made in protest against any restrictions on abortion funds via the
amendment, Senator Brooke urged that what was being done was "a blatant case of
legislating on an appropriations bill." 591 F.2d at 129, citing 123 CONG. REC. S. 11,035
(June 29, 1977). Similar statements by other proponents and opponents of the amendment supported the court's interpretation that the Hyde Amendment was meant to be
a substantive change in the law. See, e.g., 591 F.2d at 129-30, citing 123 CONG. REC. S.
19,440, 19,441, 19,443, 19,445 (Dec. 7, 1977) (remarks of Senators Magnuson, Brooke,
Javits, and Stennis).
The Preterm court also saw the "specific and detailed provisions" of the amendment as an indication of its "substantive nature." 591 F.2d at 130. Congressman
Michel commented on the exclusion of damage to a woman's mental health as being
eligible for abortion funding. 123 CONG. REc. H. 12,651, 12,656 (Dec. 6, 1977).
Senators Brooke and Javits doubted the constitutionality of requiring a certificate
from physicians that attested to long-lasting and severe physical health damage. 123
CONG. REc. S. 19,440-43 (Dec. 7, 1977). Congressman Michel also tried "to define
what was meant by the prompt reporting requirement in cases of rape and incest." 591
F.2d at 130, citing 123 CONG. REc. H. 12,652-53 (Dec. 6, 1977).
The court felt it gained most of the support for its position from statements made
by the Hyde Amendment's opponents. The court said that "[t]he universal assumption
in debate was that if the Amendment passed there would be no requirement that states
carry on the service." 591 F.2d at 130. The court quoted Congressman Stokes to say
the Amendment was "tantamount to a constitutional amendment outlawing abortions
for the poor." Id., quoting 123 CONG. REc. H. 6,085 (June 17, 1977). In the Senate,
Senator Packwood commented on the discriminatory effects the legislation would have
on the many poor women who now receive money for abortions. He argued that they
would have unwanted children or be forced to have illegal abortions. 123 CONG. REC.
S. 11,031 (June 29, 1977). The court also referenced similar comments by Senator
McGovern, id. at S. 11,040; Senator Bayh, id. at S. 11,043; Senator Brooke, 123
CONG.REc. S. 13,672 (Aug. 4, 1977); and Senator Javits, 123 CONG. REc. S. 19,443
(Dec. 7, 1977).
The court also relied on statements made by Congressman Russo, a supporter of
the Amendment. Russo said that although states would be free to fund abortions if
they wished, the federally enacted Hyde Amendment would encourage the states not to
do so. 123 CONG. REc. H. 6,097-98 (June 17, 1977). See also for similar statements 123
CONG. REc. S. 18,584-85 (Nov. 3, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 123 CONG. REC. H.
10,835 (Oct. 12, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Early); 123 CONG. REc. H. 12,653 (Dec. 6,
1977) (remarks of Rep. Smith). Note the rash of state enacted Hyde-type amendments
which has, in fact, followed. See note 23 supra.
Finally, the court relied on the fact that nowhere in the congressional debates was
it ever mentioned that the burden of funding abortions was being shifted to the states
by enacting the Hyde Amendment.
Considering this legislative history, the court concluded that Congress "was using
the unusual and frowned upon device of legislating via an appropriations measure to
accomplish a substantive result." 591 F.2d at 131.
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history, the court believed that Congress, in enacting the Hyde
Amendment, was "engaging in substantive legislation" and not merely
shifting the cost of abortions to the states."0 The substantive result
Congress was seeking to obtain through the appropriations measure
was a cutback of federal funds for abortions when the abortion decision reflected only a woman's personal choice."' Since the Hyde
Amendment was not aimed at shifting the cost of abortions to the
state, the court concluded that the states were only required to fund
abortions covered by the Hyde Amendment. It was left to the state to
decide whether it wanted to fund abortions not eligible for reimbursement under Hyde. By interpreting the Hyde Amendment as a substantive piece of legislation which obligated a state to fund only those
abortions for which it received reimbursement from the federal
government, the court avoided having to invalidate the state law on the
grounds that it was inconsistent with the Medicaid Act.
Having established the states' obligation with respect to abortion
funding under the Hyde Amendment, the Preterm court faced a third
issue. The plaintiffs contended that if the states' obligations were viewed
as identical to the federal government's under the Hyde Amendment,
then the amendment would be inconsistent with the Medicaid Act."
The plaintiffs argued that the Hyde Amendment and the Medicaid Act
should, if possible, be construed as consistent with each other.8 3 The
court agreed that its construction of the Hyde Amendment's effect on
the states' obligation was indeed inconsistent with the purposes of the
Medicaid Act. The Hyde Amendment required the federal government
to fund abortions only in cases of incest or rape when the incident was
promptly reported, where the mother's life would be endangered if the
pregnancy were carried to term, or where severe and permanent injury
would result to the mother's physical"" health. The court felt that this
latter category contravened the objectives of the Medicaid Act by impermissibly discriminating between damage to a woman's physical
health and her mental health. Such a distinction is not based on
medical need but is rather based on "diagnosis, type of illness or con80. 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 131.
83. The only way the two acts can be consistently construed is by reading the Hyde
Amendment to shift the burden to the state to pay for "non-Hyde-type" abortions.
84. Emphasis added. The court's analysis of the Hyde Amendment itself was
proper here because, by its decision that states need only fund abortions for which
federal reimbursement was available under Hyde, the validity of any challenged state
law having the same standards as Hyde would depend upon an interpretation of the
federal Amendment's constitutionality.
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dition."" Conceding all of this, the Preterm court still refused to accept plaintiff's contention that in order to read the Hyde Amendment
as consistent with the Medicaid Act, the amendment must be viewed as
shifting the burden of funding all, medically necessary nonHyde Amendment abortions to the states. Rather, the court determined
that the Hyde Amendment, to the extent that it conflicted with the
Medicaid Act, impliedly repealed portions thereof so that they should
be consistent. 6
The holdings of Mitchell and Preterm, insofar as they pertain to
the states' obligations to fund abortions, are restrictive in effect. Mitchell doubts that a state is required to fund any abortions, but if there
is such a requirement, it only extends to situations in which the
mother's life is endangered. Preterm widens the category of abortions
that must be funded by requiring states to fund those abortions eligible
for federal reimbursement. There is a trend, however, in this as yet
sparsely litigated area, to regard a state's obligation for funding abor85. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
86. 591 F.2d at 134. See notes 106 through 130 and accompanying text infra for an
example of how subsequent courts have criticized the First Circuit for this interpretation of repeal by implication.
Two other Courts of Appeals have agreed with the Preterm court's interpretation
of the Hyde Amendment. The Seventh Circuit in Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th
Cir. 1979), reversed a holding of the district court that Illinois was required to fund all
therapeutic abortions under the Medicaid Act. Agreeing with the First Circuit that the
Hyde Amendment was a substantive piece of legislation that impliedly repealed any inconsistent portions of the Medicaid Act, the Zbaraz court held that the state need only
fund those abortions which are covered by the Hyde Amendment. Id. at 202. The
court, however, remanded the case to the district court to then consider the constitutional issue of equal protection. The district court subsequently determined that both
the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment violated equal protection standards. See
notes 133-47 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F.
Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The United States Supreme Court has agreed to give
plenary consideration to the Zbaraz decision. 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979)
(No. 79-5). The district court's decision on equal protection grounds, 469 F. Supp.
1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979), discussed at notes 133-147 and accompanying text infra, is pending appeal to the Seventh Circuit, no doubt awaiting Supreme Court action on the
Seventh Circuit's holding as to the effect of the Hyde Amendment on the Medicaid
Act.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit has also joined in the Preterm decision on the effect
of the Hyde Amendment. In Hodgson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 48 U.S.L.W.
2476 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980), the court held that since a Missouri statute denied funding
for abortions to Medicaid recipients unless the abortion was necessary to save the
mother's life or the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, it was inconsistent with Title XIX of the Medicaid Act, even as amended by the Hyde Amendment. The state
statute was thus held invalid. That same day, the Eighth Circuit also ruled that a state
statute identical with the 1978-79 version of the Hyde Amendment was unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause. See notes 148-55 and accompanying
text infra.
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tions under Title XIX as being broader than Preterm and Mitchell have
defined it."
C.

The Liberal View: Casey," Busbee,11 and Rhodes 0

Several courts have held that a state participating in the Medicaid
program may not, by statute, deny funding for abortions which a
physician has deemed to be medically necessary. These courts have
primarily based their holdings on supremacy clause violations. The
court in Casey does an in-depth statutory analysis, the rationale on
which the liberal view is based. Busbee and Rhodes focus on why the
87. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Roe v. Casey, 464 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In the same vein as these cases, which are discussed at
notes 77-125 and accompanying text infra, but with a slightly different twist, is Doe v.
Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978). The challenged state statute in Kenley required
states to fund abortions only where the mother's life would be endangered if the
pregnancy were carried to term. This statute, however, was accompanied by an explicitly stated objective of eliminating any funding whatever for nontherapeutic abortions. In light of the fact that the state specifically stated this objective, the Fourth Circuit disposed of the case by requiring the legislature to amend the statute consonant
with this stated objective by replacing the "life" endangerment standard with a
"substantial health" endangerment standard.
88. 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In Casey, the plaintiffs, who consisted of a
group of indigent pregnant women, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, various "health care providers," and physicians, primarily alleged that a
Pennsylvania statute which precluded abortion funding under the Medicaid program
except where the mother's life was endangered, violated rights guaranteed them by article 6, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (supremacy clause), as well as under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment. Because the court
found a violation of the supremacy clause to be dispositive of the issue, it did not reach
the other constitutional questions raised by the plaintiffs. In a final judgment on the
merits, the district court granted the permanent injunction and declaratory relief
sought by these plaintiffs.
89. 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Plaintiffs in Busbee included indigent
pregnant women, physicians, and various health centers. The Georgia statute challenged was one substantively identical to the 1978-79 version of the Hyde Amendment. See
note 20 and accompanying text supra. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the first, fifth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and sought
preliminary injunctive relief. Since an adequate basis for granting relief was found on
statutory grounds, the other constitutional challenges were not considered by the
court.
90. 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Ohio 1979). Plaintiffs in Rhodes included Planned
Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio, a Rape Crisis Center, a licensed physician, and two
family-planning agencies. Plaintiffs alleged that it was in violation of the supremacy
clause for Ohio to limit funding to those abortions necessary to preserve the mother's
life or to those cases where the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. They also
urged that it was equally violative to fund abortions in Hyde-type circumstances which
added to the aforementioned categories, instances where abortion is necessary to prevent severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother. See notes 117-18
and accompanying text infra. Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief for the
alleged violations.
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restrictive view of Preterm should not be followed. Although these
three principal cases all reach the same conclusion, a discussion of the
major focus of each of the cases best illustrates the thrust of the liberal
view.
1. Rationale for the Requirement of Funding for All Medically
Necessary Abortions-A Statutory Analysis
In Roe v. Casey,9 the court held that a state was required to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. Whether an abortion was considered to be medically necessary was to be determined in
accordance with the test set forth in Doe v. Bolton."' Bolton held that
a physician was to make the determination of necessity and he could
rely upon factors "relevant to the well-being of the patient," such as
the woman's "physical, emotional, psychological, and familial"
background." The Casey court's decision rested on its interpretation
of substantially the same sections of Title XIX, and regulations promulgated thereunder, that were interpreted by the Mitchell and
Preterm courts.
The Casey court, citing Beal v. Doe,'" said that a state must provide assistance in a reasonable fashion for medical treatment in the five
categories set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (1)-(5); 9' further, the
assistance provided must be consistent with the objective of the
Medicaid Act, 96 that being the provision of financial assistance for
medically necessary services to those too poor to afford them. 7 It was
the Casey court's construction of the phrase "necessary medical services" from the Medicaid Act's appropriations section which led it to
the opposite conclusion reached by the Mitchell court. Whereas Mitchell construed the phrase "necessary medical services" very
narrowly, 98 the Casey court took a broader view of the term and held
that a state could not deny funds for any abortion deemed medically
necessary under the Bolton test. 99 The court found support for its con91. 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
92. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
93. Id. at 192.
94. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
95. See note 39 supra.
96. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977). See notes 10-25 and accompanying text
supra.
97. 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970),
the appropriations section of Title XIX. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
99. Note that although Mitchell and Casey are analyzing the same statutes and
regulations, it is their difference in the construction of certain undefined terms in the
statute (i.e., medically necessary) that leads these courts to different results. See notes
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clusion in an implementation regulation of Title XIX, similar to the
one relied on by the Preterm court.' 0 The regulation was interpreted
as requiring states to furnish "at least the minimum necessary medical
services required for the successful treatment of the particular medical
condition presented." 10 ' A state may not limit or prohibit funds for a
medically necessary procedure unless the reason for doing so is not
"solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition." 1 2 The
Casey court further held that the Hyde Amendment was merely a congressional enactment of the Beal decision"0 3 that funds need not be
provided for nontherapeutic or elective abortions.' 0 ' A permanent injunction was granted and the restrictive state statute was not
enforced.'
2. Critique of Preterm'sAnalysis - Another Rationale for the Liberal
View
In Doe v. Busbee,'0 6 a Georgia statute limiting abortion funding
under the Medicaid program contained substantially the same provisions as the 1978-1979 version of the federal Hyde Amendment. Having come after the Preterm'"7 decision, Busbee was one of the first
52-54 and accompanying text supra for the rationale behind Mitchell's refusal to
follow the Bolton test. See note 93 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the
Bolton test.
100. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1978). The regulation relied on by Casey is the
earlier version of and contains substantially the same provisions as 42 C.F.R. § 440.230
(1979). See note 69 supra.
101. 464 F. Supp. at 501.
102. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1978). The court found further support for its interpretation from the last part of this regulation which stated: "Appropriate limits may
be placed on services based on such criteria as medical necessity or those contained in
utilization or medical review procedures." Id. The court construed the term "such
criteria as medical necessity" to mean that a state "may apply limits upon the medical
procedure it supplies, such as nonmedical necessity .... but [does] not [limit] the other
requirements and objectives of Title XIX that all medically necessary services be reimbursed." 464 F. Supp. at 501. The court also relied on the quote from Beal v. Doe that
"serious statutory questions" may arise if a state denied funds under Medicaid for
necessary medical procedures. Id. at 502.
103. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). See notes 10-25 and accompanying text supra.
104. 464 F. Supp. at 502. This interpretation of the Hyde Amendment may not be
completely valid in light of the fact that under Hyde, some abortions which may in fact
be deemed to be therapeutic or medically necessary are denied funds. For example, the
court in Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.
Ohio 1979) pointed out that serious mental health problems may result from carrying a
pregnancy to term. Such a disorder would not, under Hyde, bring an abortion within
the realm of federal reimbursement.
105. 464 F. Supp. at 503.
106. 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979),
107. See note 86 and accompanying text supra. Recall that Preterm had ruled that
the Hyde Amendment impliedly repealed portions of Title XIX.
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cases that had to contend with the issue of whether Hydp actually impliedly repealed portions of Title XIX, thereby validating any state law

which provided funding only for those abortions funded under the
Hyde Amendment.'10 Indeed, the defendants in Busbee argued that if
the court enjoined enforcement of the Georgia statute, the court would
a fortiori find the Hyde Amendment itself to be unconstitutional,' 0 9
which would not be proper since the federal government was not a party
to the suit. The court, however, was not persuaded; such an argument
rested on the adoption of the Preterm decision," 0 a decision which the
Busbee court expressly rejected."' The basis for rejecting the Preterm
analysis was two-fold.

First, the Busbee court felt that the Preterm court was unjustified
in looking to the legislative history of the statute at all. The Preterm
court had conceded that the words of the Hyde Amendment were
unambiguous and that there would be no need to look to any extrinsic

aids to help construe it. I12 It felt, however, that construing the amendment to impose the costs of "non-Hyde-type" therapeutic abortions

on the state would be inconsistent with the basic policy of the Medicaid
108. The Busbee court engaged in substantially the same analysis of Title XIX as did
Casey, see notes 91-105 supra; however, Busbee relied on 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1978),
the regulation similar to 42 C.F.R. § 449. 10(a)(5)(i) (1978). Busbee was in accord with
the first part of the Pretermdecision which had held that a state crosses the line of permissible discrimination when it singles out a medical procedure, such as pregnancy,
and restricts funding thereof to only life and death circumstances. The Busbee court,
however, did not agree with the implication that can be drawn from the Preterm
holding, that discrimination of even medically necessary abortions is permissible if
such discrimination is based on degree of need. Busbee held that it is impermissible to
discriminate medically necessary abortions in any fashion. The reason for the
divergence here is explained by the Busbee court as a difference in the sections of 42
C.F.R. § 440.230 upon which the two decisions rest. Preterm relies on § 440.230(c)(1)
which prohibits a denial of funding "solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition." The Preterm court also made reference to the early version of the regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)(i), which said discrimination is allowed based upon
degree of medical necessity. 591 F.2d 121, 126 (4th Cir. 1979).
Busbee, on the other hand, relies on § 440.230(c)(2), which states that a state
"may place appropriate limits on a service based on medical necessity." Busbee interprets this as meaning "a state may permissibly discriminate in its provision of services
based on degrees of need, but only within that range of degrees of need which exceed
the level of medical necessity." 471 F. Supp. at 1330 n.9.
109. 471 F. Supp. at 1331-32. The defendant's reasoning for this argument rests on
the Preterm holding that the Hyde Amendment substantively alters parts of Title XIX,
leaving the states free to fund abortions not eligible for federal reimbursement only if
they so wished. Defendants asserted that Georgia's policy, as reflected in its abortion
funding statute, that funding be provided only in federally reimbursed circumstances
was not inconsistent with Title XIX.
110. See note 109 supra.
111. 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
112. 591 F.2d at 128, citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 534 (1978).
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Act, that being a mutual participation of federal and state governments in funding medical procedures. Therefore, the Preterm court
felt a need to look to the legislative history of the Amendment.' 1 3 One
problem the Busbee court had with this analysis was that a state voluntarily chooses to participate in the Medicaid program; thus, saying that
any obligation "imposed" on a state runs counter to the elective
nature of the participation.""
The Preterm court's interpretation of Title XIX's policy"5 has also
met some criticism. In Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v.
Rhodes," 6 the Southern District Court of Ohio held in accord with the
Busbee case and issued injunctions against the enforcement of an Ohio
statute and a state policy regulation. The Meshel Amendment," 7 a
rider to an appropriations bill, was of the highly restrictive-type abortion statute, permitting Medicaid funds to be used only for abortions
for pregnancies that endangered the mother's life or that resulted from
rape or incest. The "Ohio State Plan""' 8 was a letter sent to physicians, hospitals, and health care clinics setting forth the state's abortion funding standards. The policy of Ohio as expressed in this letter
was to allow abortion funding in life endangerment and severe
physical health damage situations. The Meshel Amendment superceded
the "Ohio State Plan." The defendants argued that Preterm required
that the "Ohio State Plan" covering the 1978-1979 "Hyde-type" abortions be allowed to stand. The Rhodes court held, however, that as a
result of these state statutes restricting funds for abortions that are
medically necessary, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. The
largest part of its rationale was based on criticism of the Preterm decision."' As far as the basic policy behind the Medicaid program was
concerned, the Rhodes court said that Preterm's reliance on the
"federal-state cooperation" was misplaced.' 0 Rather, the "basic
policy" of Title XIX, as the Rhodes court saw it, was "to provide
medical assistance and rehabilitation services for certain
113. The Preterm court relied on United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310
U.S. 534 (1939), which held that a court should not venture beyond the plain meaning
of a statute unless that interpretation produces a result at variance with the basic policy
of the statute. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 1979).
114. 471 F. Supp. at 1333.
115. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
116. 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
117. H.B. 204 § 210 (1979) (1979-80 biennial budget for the State of Ohio).
118. Ohio State Plan (Medical Assistance Letter 71), Ohio Dep't of Public Welfare
(1978).
119. The Rhodes court's analysis of the Medicaid Act was substantialy the same as
Busbee and Casey.
120. 477 F. Supp. at 538.
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individuals."'' The cooperative aspect, the "basic policy" upon
which Preterm based its reason for looking to the legislative history,
was merely a means to achieving this end. Nowhere in Title XIX was
the possibility foreclosed that a state may have to fund 100% of certain medical services.122
Even assuming that Preterm's deviation from the plain meaning of
the statute was justified, the Preterm court's reliance on the substance
1 23
of the legislative history of Title XIX has met with equal disfavor.
This served as Busbee's second ground for rejecting the Preterm
analysis. Judge Kinneary's discussion in Rhodes provides an even more
thorough criticism of Preterm's use of legislative history than does
Busbee. 12 " The Rhodes court started with the premise than an implied
repeal of an appropriations rider is "strongly disfavored," and was
unpersuaded by Preterm's departure from that premise.'12 Preterm
relied mainly on the content of debates which occurred prior to the
enactment of the Hyde Amendment.' 2 ' The Rhodes court noted that
such debates were "the least reliable of enactment materials which can
be used in interpreting statutes."' 2 7 Not all Congressmen attended
these debates and the contents thereof were likely to be edited.' 2 Both
Rhodes and Busbee criticized Preterm'sreliance on the predictions of
the effect of the Amendment given by those opposed to it. The Rhodes
court, citing Busbee, said that "giving effect to the doomsday predictions of dissenters turns those predictions into self-fulfilling prophecies."' 29 The Rhodes court also pointed out that the debates contained
"express statements that all Congress was concerned with in the Hyde
Amendment was federal dollars.""'3 Finally, the Rhodes court concluded that had Congress intended the appropriations rider to be a
substantive measure, it could have added express language to the effect
that a state has no obligations greater than those of the federal government under Title XIX. Congress did not include such language.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
123. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
124. 477 F. Supp. at 539.
125. Id. at 538.
126. Id. The court went on to say that "committee and conference reports are much
more productive legislative materials" than the floor debates. No such materials existed for the Hyde Amendment. Id. at 539.
127. See note 68 supra.
128. 477 F. Supp. at 539.
129. Id. See note 78 supra which sets forth the specific examples to which Rhodes
refers.
130. 477 F. Supp. at 539, citing 591 F.2d at 134.
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Both Busbee and Rhodes effectively dispose of the argument that
states are only required to provide funding for abortions which are
eligible for reimbursement under Hyde. The reasoning upon which
that argument rests suffers from two flaws. First, there was no reason
to look to the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment. Its language
was not ambiguous, and the inconsistency the Preterm court saw between the plain meaning of the Hyde Amendment and the policy of Title
XIX was based on a misinterpretation of that "policy." Thus, a deviation from the plain meaning of the amendment was not justified. Second, even assuming that the deviation was justified, the type of
history upon which the argument relied was not of the quality that
would be necessary to support the strongly disfavored vehicle of an appropriations bill impliedly repealing portions of a statute. Thus,
Busbee and Rhodes have found unpersuasive the argument that the
states have an obligation to fund only those abortions eligible for
federal reimbursement. Instead, these courts have adopted a more
liberal view of the states' obligation. That view, as it now stands, is
that states must provide funds for all medically necessary abortions to
eligible Medicaid recipients.
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE HYDE AMENDMENT
AND SIMILAR STATE STATUTES

In addition to supremacy clause challenges, state abortion statutes
have also been attacked on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."' Although most courts
that have issued injunctions against the state funding laws have done
so based on the supremacy challenge, there are a few courts which
have been receptive to and have issued rulings on these equal protection challenges.' 32
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. Reproductive Health Services v. Freeman, 48 U.S.L.W. 2475 (8th Cir. Jan. 9,
1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Right to Choose v. Byrne,
169 N.J. Super. 543 (1979). Byrne was a state case in which a New Jersey abortion funding statute was challenged. The statute challenged by the plaintiffs was similar in scope
to the Hyde Amendment. The Byrne court decided in favor of plaintiffs on equal protection grounds. The court said that the state statute was to be subjected to strict
scrutiny since the fundamental right to enjoy one's health was involved. Funding of
abortions through the Medicaid program furthers this fundamental right and any
restrictions on the funds would have to be justified by a compelling state interest. 169
N.J. Super. at 551. The court relied on Roe v. Wade to determine that the asserted interest of protecting the potentiality of human life and "encouragement of normal
childbirth" are not compelling "when the health of the pregnant women is
threatened." Id. at 552. The Byrne court said that "health" is not restricted merely to
the Hyde-type amendment's "severe and longlasting impairment," but extends "to
protection against all significant threats to health." Id. See note 36 supra for a discus-
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In Zbaraz v. Quern, 33
' plaintiffs challenged an Illinois statute that
restricted abortion funds for Medicaid recipients to life endangering
circumstances on the ground, inter alia, that the statute violated their
rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The major thrust of the challenge was that indigent women who needed
abortions were being treated differently than indigent women who
needed other surgical procedures.' 3 ,The court rejected plaintiff's contention that a fundamental rightI"' was involved and that therefore the
statute should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Rather, the court applied
the rational relationship test.' 36 The Illinois statute could withstand
constitutional attack if it could be found to rationally further "some
legitimate, articulated state purpose."""
The court easily disposed of the legitimacy of the state's articulated

interest in "fiscal frugality."' 38 Limiting public funds for abortions to
life saving situations was not rationally related to "fiscal frugality"
since the court found it to be more expensive to fund prenatal care,
childbirth, and postpartum care than to provide funding for
abortions.' 9
The second interest offered by the state to justify its statute was the
state's concern in protecting fetal life through the encouragement of
childbirth.'

0

This led the court to a two-part holding. The Zbaraz

court recognized that the United States Supreme Court has held the
state's interest in protecting fetal life to be a legitimate one in some
sion of a court that has upheld a state statute that was challenged on equal protection
grounds.
133. Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), on remand, 469 F. Supp. 1212
(N.D. 111. 1979), juris. postponed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5).
134. 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
135. Id. at 1217. Plaintiffs, relying on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), urged that
the Illinois law posed an impediment to an indigent pregnant woman's fundamental
right to an abortion decision. The Zbaraz court said that the case of Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977) was dispositive of plaintiff's argument. The Maher Court said that the
right protected by Roe. v. Wade did not limit the ability of a state, through allocation
of its funds, to encourage one medical procedure (childbirth) over another (abortion).
432 U.S. at 474. "The indigency that may make it difficult . . .for some women to

have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the [state] regulation." Id.
at 475. Likewise, the Zbaraz court felt that the Illinois statute did not impinge on any
fundamental right.
136. 469 F. Supp. at 1218.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.In footnote 8 to its opinion, the Zbaraz court recognized evidence from
plaintiff that the average cost of an abortion is $145.00 versus $1,370.00 to fund a
childbirth. But see note 44 supra.
140. 469 F. Supp. at 1219.
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cirumstances. " In determining the weight to be given the interest
however, the mother's interest in her own health must also be considered. As the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment itself stood,
the state's interest in protecting the fetus in the early months of
pregnancy was outweighed by the adverse effect on the mother's
health."' The state's interest in protecting fetal life does, however, increase as the fetus becomes viable in later stages of pregnancy." 3 Relying on Roe v. Wade, '" the Zbaraz court determined that after viability,
the state may deny abortion funds, except in instances where abortion
is necessary to save the life of the mother. Thus, the two-tiered holding
of Zbaraz is that prior to fetal viability, a state must provide funds for
all medically necessary abortions; after fetal viability, funds need only
be appropriated for abortions which are necessary to save the life of
the mother." 5 Insofar as the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment
did not conform to these requirements, the court held them unconstitutional."' By hinging the determination of abortion funding on
the stage of fetal viability, it appears that the Zbaraz case is the one
most consistent with past Supreme Court analysis of the abortion issue
in general. "" The decision is also unique with regard to where it fits in
the spectrum of cases that have decided the issue of states' obligations
to fund abortions. It encompasses the most restrictive view, since it requires only life-preserving abortions to be funded once the point of
fetal viability is reached. Prior to fetal viability, however, the court
141. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. 469 F. Supp. at 1219-20. The court explained:
As a consequence of the state's viewing the fetus apart from the mother, the
mother may be subjected to considerable risk of severe medical problems, which
may even result in her death. Under the Hyde Amendment standard, a doctor may
not certify a woman as being eligible for a publicly funded abortion except where
"the life of the mother would be endangered . . .or ... where severe and longlasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were
carried to term. . . ." Most health problems associated with pregnancy would not
be covered by this language .... and those that would be covered would often not
be apparent until the later stages of pregnancy, when an abortion is more
dangerous to the mother .... At the earlier stages of pregnancy, and even at the
later stages, doctors are usually unable to determine the degree of injury which
may result from a particular medical condition .... The effect of the new criteria,
then, will be to increase substantially maternal morbidity and mortality among indigent pregnant women. . ..
143. Id. at 1221.
144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
145. 469 F. Supp. at 1221.
146. Id.
147. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the major abortion case of our time, was
similarly patterned. See note 3 supra.
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adopts the most liberal view, requiring states to fund all medically
necessary abortions.
Taking a somewhat different approach from Zbaraz, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Reproductive Health Services v.
Freeman"8 recently held that a Missouri statute which provided funding for only those abortions eligible for federal reimbursement under
the 1978-1979 version of the Hyde Amendment violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.'"9
The statute was held to violate equal protection principles in two
ways. First, the court viewed the statute as discriminating between indigent pregnant women "who seek either childbirth or a Hyde Amendment abortion"' 50 and those pregnant indigents seeking "medically
necessary non-Hyde Amendment abortions."'' The court noted that
in addition to a "woman's fundamental interest in seeking an abortion,"'5 " she had additional concern in protecting her health, an interest the court said may itself be fundamental. Given these substantial
concerns, the court said that a more scrutinizing standard than
"minimal rationality"'" must be used to test the statute's constitutionality. The court said that the state's interest in protecting fetal life,
legitimate though it may be, was not promoted by the Missouri statute.
Since the statute required the state to fund medically necessary abortions for pregnancies resulting from incest or rape, it was invidious
discrimination not to fund all other medically necessary abortions.
Secondly, the Freeman court stated that the statute also violated
equal protection in that it discriminated between indigent women seeking medically necessary procedures other than abortions and those
seeking non-Hyde Amendment abortions. In both groups, the women
are seeking aid to procure medical procedures which are necessary to
preserve their health. There is no legitimate state interest furthered by
the discrimination." 5 ' The state's interest in preserving fetal life is not a
permissible objective if "the pregnant woman's life or health is at
stake."' 5 5 Thus, the state statute, even though it complied with the
Hyde Amendment, was held unconstitutional.
In sum, the Zbaraz court found a state Hyde-type statute to violate
equal protection, depending on the stage of fetal viability. The
148. 48 U.S.L.W. 2475 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1980).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

150. 48 U.S.L.W. at 2475.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.at 2476.

155. Id.
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Freeman court found a similar state statute to violate equal protection,
but did not tie its holding into stages of fetal viability. Although these
two holdings differ in their form, the result of the decisions is that a
state statute which patterns itself after the 1978-1979 version of the
federal Hyde Amendment is unconstitutional. The holdings of the
equal protection cases, Freeman, in toto, and Zbaraz, in part, are in
accord with those supremacy clause cases which have taken the liberal
view."' Together these cases form a majority view that states are required to fund all medically necessary abortions.
V.

CONCLUSION

As Justice Blackmun noted in the major abortion case of our time,
the issue is a sensitive, emotional one. 1 " Perhaps the most effective
way that those opposed to abortion could inhibit one's choice of that
procedure is by withholding the financial means to procure an abortion. Unfortunately, it would appear that the ones most hurt by this
are the indigent.' 58
Although the Beal decision provided one way for monies for abortions to be withheld, 5 9 its holding was limited in scope since it applied
only to funding of elective abortions. However, the effect of the Hyde
Amendment and its state progeny was much more restrictive. These
enactments would prevent indigent women from obtaining abortions
which physicians may deem medically necessary, a result thought to be
grossly unfair in view of the fact that other medically necessary procedures are not denied to the recipients of the Medicaid Act.
The challenges to these state-enacted abortion funding statutes
have been based mainly on supremacy and equal protection clause
grounds. The decisions lie on a spectrum from the most restrictive,
which would deny funding of any abortions except those necessary to
save the mother's life, to the most liberal, which would require states
to fund all medically necessary abortions. In the middle are the decisions maintaining that states need only fund those abortions covered
by the Hyde Amendment. The two courts that have taken this "middle" approach to abortion funding first had to determine the effect the
Hyde Amendment had on the states' obligations under the Medicaid
156. See notes 88-130 and accompanying text supra.
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
158. Courts have not, however, viewed the withholding of funds for abortions as inhibiting one's abortion decision. See note 15 supra.
159. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). See notes 10-23 and accompanying text
supra.
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Program. In order for the state statutes to withstaud a supremacy
clause challenge, the courts had to determine that the Hyde Amendment was a vehicle used by Congress to limit the spending of funds on
abortions. According to these courts, Hyde did not serve to shift the
burden of funding all abortions not eligible for federal reimbursement
to the states. To the extent that the Hyde Amendment conflicted with
Title XIX, it was said to have repealed inconsistent portions thereof.
It may be that resolution of the entire state abortion funding issue
will lie in a determination of whether this repeal by implication is accepted. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has agreed to give
plenary consideration to the Zbaraz case, 16 in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had interpreted the Hyde Amendment to impliedly repeal inconsistent portions of Title XIX. If the Supreme Court
holds that the Hyde Amendment does repeal inconsistent portions of
Title XIX, then the supremacy clause challenges to any state statute
that includes at least those abortions covered by the Hyde Amendment
will no longer be available. The courts could read the Hyde Amendment as setting the state's standards for funding abortions, and since
Hyde would be consistent with Title XIX, no statute, federal or state,
would contravene it. Of course, the very restrictive state laws which
preclude reimbursement even for Hyde-abortions could still be
challenged on supremacy clause grounds. Even if the Hyde Amendment is held to impliedly repeal portions of Title XIX, however, equal
protection challenges on the constitutionality of Hyde itself will still remain. At least three cases"' have struck down state statues precluding
funds for medically necessary abortions on equal protection grounds.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court decides that Hyde is inconsistent with and does not impliedly repeal Title XIX, then states
will thereafter be compelled to fund all medically necessary abortions,
since any statute limiting the funding of such abortions would be in
contravention of Title XIX of the Medicaid Act.' 62 Several cases have
160. See 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1979) (No. 79-5).
161. Reproductive Health Services v. Freeman, 48 U.S.L.W. 2475 (8th Cir. Jan. 9,
1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Right to Choose v. Byrne,
169 N.J. Super. 543 (1979).
162. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978). If, however, a statutory analysis similar to
the one used by the court in D.R. v. Mitchell, 469 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978), is
adopted, the effect would be that states would not be required to fund any abortions
except perhaps those necessary to save the mother's life because Hyde and similar state
statutes would be viewed as being consistent with Title XIX. No other court has as yet
adopted the approach taken by Mitchell. See notes 36-60 and accompanying text supra
for an analysis of Mitchell.
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decided the issue in just this way. 6 ' In any event, the final resolution
of this issue will have to await the outcome of the Supreme Court's
decision in Zbaraz.
Joan Meyerhoefer Roddy
163. Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Roe v. Casey, 464 F.
Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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